This is a collection of articles on two central topics in epistemology: certainty and surfaces. Of the ten articles, four discuss Avrum Stroll's Surfaces. The topics explored have been the subject of intense philosophical debate since ancient times.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.4 (2001) 605-606 [Access article in PDF] Ben Rogers. A. J. Ayer: A Life. New York: Grove Press, 1999. Pp. ix + 402. Cloth, $30.00. A. J. Ayer (1910-89) had the misfortune, for a philosopher, to write his most influential book, Language, Truth, and Logic, when he was in his twenties, even though he continued to publish into his seventies, and to have (...) his nonphilosophical life overwhelm his philosophical one. Almost everyone now knows the story of how he saved Naomi Campbell by going a round with Mike Tyson. Ben Rogers nicely intertwines the facts of Ayer's day-to-day life—which is not to say "quotidian," given Ayer's ego and libido—with his philosophical peregrinations.Although Ayer picked up logical positivism in Vienna when attending sessions of the Vienna Circle, he had accepted the main lines of an empiricism and positivism earlier and on his own. For twentieth-century British philosophy, Language, Truth, and Logic was both a philosophical Declaration of Independence (from metaphysics) and the Constitution for a new philosophy. Unfortunately, its founding principle, the principle of verifiability, was irremediably flawed, notwithstanding Ayer's best efforts, notably in the Preface to the second edition of 1946. Logical positivism in Britain lasted for only about a decade (1935-46). In fact, it may have been less. Language, Truth, and Logic was published in 1936, and Ayer "went off to war" in 1940, to speak loosely. (He spent a significant part of it in a Mediterranean villa, a Park Avenue apartment, "a palatial home" in Paris lent him by Guy de Rothschild, and in the best restaurants with friendly women.) No major British philosopher was championing Logical Positivism between 1940 and 1945. When Ayer returned to Oxford in 1945, he discovered that "the [philosophical] climate had changed; before the conflict he had been the leader of the avant-garde; now the brighter students and the young dons looked on logical positivism as old hat. He had mysteriously passed "from being a young Turk to being, at the age of thirty-five, to almost an elder statesman, without ever having known the plenitude of office'" (198). During the late 1940's, Ayer wrote mostly for London literary and arts magazines. The profession of philosophy disappointed him, and later, he found it difficult to keep up "in logic and the philosophy of maths and sciences" (262).Logical positivism had a longer life in North America, to which several of its members emigrated. But its influence was felt much longer in both places, primarily for its emphasis on three things: empiricism, empiricism, empiricism.Ayer continued to publish philosophy until the mid-1980s. Given the demise of logical positivism, he was something of a dinosaur, albeit a Tyrannosaurus Rex. There was no one else quite like him, and yet he could not be ignored. He was a formidable critic of whatever most other British philosophers were doing. In addition to his obvious intellectual brilliance, he was an excellent writer and expositor. After 1970, most of his books are potboilers, skillful in execution, but of no lasting merit, for example, Russell and Moore (1971), Russell (1972), Hume (1980), and Wittgenstein (1985). Ayer told Stephen Spender that "Russell's History of Western Philosophy... had made its author a fortune and he hoped his [Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (1981)] would do the same" (326). [End Page 605] He accepted a L 30,000. advance for a book about Thomas Paine, about whom he knew virtually nothing, and then did his research: "I mugged up just enough information from some American scholar, whose name I forget, an essay of Michael Foot and, principally, Moncure Conway" (342).As prominent as Ayer was in British culture—writing for the Spectator and Horizon, giving commentary on soccer, appearing on television, and championing liberal causes—he was something of a philosophical outsider. He had more affinity for the Cambridge philosophers, Moore, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein, than for his Oxford colleagues; the heart of his career was spent at the University of London, before... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Dictionary of Seventeenth-Century British PhilosophersA. P. MartinichAndrew Pyle, general editor. The Dictionary of Seventeenth-Century British Philosophers. 2 volumes. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2000. Pp. xxi + 932. Cloth, $550.00.The history of modern philosophy is flourishing. More scholars are producing excellent works in this area than ever before. A large part of this health is due to scholars whose primary training is not in philosophy, such as historians of (...) political thought or literature (hereafter: historians). The dictionary being reviewed here is a case in point, a production of more than ninety scholars of whom the overwhelming majority are not formally trained philosophers.The dictionary consists of about 400 entries, alphabetically from Isaac Abendana (d. 1699) to Richard Zouche (1590-1661) and chronologically from John Case and Richard Hooker, both of whom died in 1600, to Richard Mead (1673-1754). As this list indicates, the general editor construed "philosopher" very broadly, too broadly, I think. There should be no objection to including scientists like Robert Boyle and Newton, theologians like William Chillingsworth and Henry Hammond, and poets like Andrew Marvell and John Milton, each of whom wrote some works with philosophical import. But Ralph Bathurst, a physician, comes no closer to being a philosopher than being "an early admirer of Hobbes's scientific work and [having] contributed some enthusiastic Latin verses to the latter's Humane Nature (1650)" (75a). Likewise Richard Barckley (fl. 1598), about whose life virtually "[n]othing is known" and whose sole book may be described as consisting of "meatpies stuffed with commonplaces"—Montaigne's phrase—does not deserve inclusion (55a, 56a). (Jill Kraye, the author of the article, serves Barckley very well.)Ramist logicians "are largely excluded... [because] they tended to assimilate logic to rhetoric and to limit it to the orderly exposition of what is already known" (p. x). Nonetheless, it is unfortunate, I think, that Abraham Fraunce (c. 1558-1633) and George Downham (d. 1634) are not included.The best articles tend to be about the best philosophers of the age: Thomas Hobbes and John Locke by G. A. J. Rogers, Shaftesbury by David McNaughton, and Francis Bacon by Graham Rees (who pointedly observed about Historia ventorum that "Bacon accomplished the considerable feat of making the weather boring" [41b]). Although by quality of thought and influence, each of these warrant longer treatment, the editor was right to restrict their length to a modest six or seven pages, the same length as those about William Ames, William Harvey, Bernard Mandeville, and John Toland. There are plenty of other places to go for information about the great philosophers. What we want and what the Dictionary provides are articles about the obscure philosophers.Some of the other especially well wrought articles are those on Richard Baxter by William Lamont, Walter Charleton by Margaret J. Osler, Joseph Glanvill by Richard Popkin, John Hales by Victor Nuovo, John Wilkins by John Henry, and Thomas White by Beverley Southgate.The editor is not nationalistic in his understanding of "British." Scots who spent their academic career on the Continent are included. Also included are the Czech John Comenius (1592-1670), the Dutchman Franciscus Mercurius van [End Page 598] Helmont (1614-98), and the Venetian Marc Antonio De Dominis (1560-1624), as they should, because of their influence on British thought or sometime residence. By the same token, Hugo Grotius should have an entry; but he does not.An average of two pages each is devoted to six women, Mary Astell, Catherine Cockburn, Ann Conway, Margaret Cavendish, Jane Lead, and Damaris Cudworth Masham. They deserve more space, especially Cavendish, whose The World's Olio (1655) includes a utopian scheme.Some other articles that I wish had been longer include those about John Bramhall, Richard Crackanthorpe, William Davenant, and John Eacherd, each roughly two pages. Although the proportional space allotted to a thinker is generally right, I think some figures should not have been included at all. John Flavel (1596-1617) does not deserve even the 3 column inches devoted to him. Better to have assigned those inches to someone else. None of the remaining articles should be shorter than they are, not even the five pages devoted... (shrink)

In Wollstonecraft’s early writings, she articulates the foundational theological and philosophical principles that would underpin her work throughout her career. One difference between her early and later work lies in the way that the values to which she refers are combined. Whereas Wollstonecraft at first appeals to the separate ideals of independence, equality, and virtue, from the 1790s onwards she integrates these into a characteristic republican framework that was in common use amongst dissenting theorists at the time. The set of (...) values on which Wollstonecraft draws, and the version of the republican framework that she develops, closely resemble those of Richard Price with whose work she was familiar. Examining the structural similarities between their respective models, I argue, gives us an insight into the systematic manner of aspects of Wollstonecraft’s own thought. It also allows us to see how Wollstonecraft goes beyond the republicanism of Price and others as she develops her own feminist solutions to the problems of structural domination. (shrink)

Two rotational bands have been identified and characterized in the proton-magic N = Z + 1 nucleus Ni-57. These bands complete the systematics of well-and superdeformed rotational bands in the light nickel isotopes starting from doubly magic Ni-56 to Ni-60. High-spin states in Ni-57 have been produced in the fusion-evaporation reaction Si-28(S-32, 2p1n)Ni-57 and studied with the gamma-ray detection array GAMMASPHERE operated in conjunction with detectors for evaporated light charged particles and neutrons. The features of the rotational bands in Ni-57 (...) are compared to those of neighbouring isotopes and interpreted by means of configuration-dependent cranked Nilsson-Strutinsky calculations. The two observed high-spin bands are considered signature partners and assigned to configurations with one 1g(9/2) proton and one 1g(9/2) neutron, resulting in an unambiguous understanding of the energetically favoured signature alpha = -1/2 band but a somewhat less satisfactory description of the signature alpha = +1/2 band. (shrink)

Las corrientes filosóficas de inspiración cartesiana tarde o temprano tienen que afrontar el solipsismo como un resultado al menos plausible de su desarrollo. La Fenomenología no podía evitar la misma suerte. Después de un rápido panorama en lo tocante a la fenomenología husserliana y el solipsismo, pasamos a exponer críticamente el texto de las Meditaciones cartesianas de Husserl, específicamente la quinta. Intentaremos señalar la insuficiencia de la exposición husserliana a la hora de superar, desde sus propias bases, la amenaza del (...) solipsismo. (shrink)

Context: Constructivist approaches to cognition have mostly been descriptive, and now face the challenge of specifying the mechanisms that may support the acquisition of knowledge. Departing from cognitivism, however, requires the development of a new functional framework that will support causal, powerful and goal-directed behavior in the context of the interaction between the organism and the environment. Problem: The properties affecting the computational power of this interaction are, however, unclear, and may include partial information from the environment, exploration, distributed processing (...) and aggregation of information, emergence of knowledge and directedness towards relevant information. Method: We posit that one path towards such a framework may be grounded in these properties, supported by dynamical systems. To assess this hypothesis, we describe computational models inspired from swarm intelligence, which we use as a metaphor to explore the practical implications of the properties highlighted. Results: Our results demonstrate that these properties may serve as the basis for complex operations, yielding the elaboration of knowledge and goal-directed behavior. Implications: This work highlights aspects of interaction that we believe ought to be taken into account when characterizing the possible mechanisms underlying cognition. The scope of the models we describe cannot go beyond that of a metaphor, however, and future work, theoretical and experimental, is required for further insight into the functional role of interaction with the environment for the elaboration of complex behavior. Constructivist content: Inspiration for this work stems from the constructivist impetus to account for knowledge acquisition based on interaction. (shrink)

The idea of the moral good is considered a desirable and appreciated real existence. With reference to teachers it constitutes a personal pattern of judicious acting. Their special task is not only to teach necessary knowledge to students but also to instil moral conduct in them i.e. to form ‘a correct character’. This notion was present at the beginning of the 20th century and is also reflected in Archbishop Józef Bilczewski’s letter ‘The Character’ (1920). The ideas presented there remain still (...) valid also in the present historic moment of the nation. (shrink)

Summary The Copernican system was condemned as heretical by a decree of the Roman Inquisition in 1633. This decree was effectively, though not officially, withdrawn in 1757, after which date Catholic astronomers felt themselves free to accept and propagate the system without reserve. Between these dates their attitudes varied greatly. In France the decree was never promulgated and was legally unenforceable. Astronomers could be Copernican without any fear of consequences and most of them were, though some, out of respect for (...) the Church, refrained from declaring themselves publicly. In Italy the possible risks were greater, but a few Copernican or near-Copernican works were published without hostile reactions. The ecclesiastical authorities were tolerant and made little positive effort to enforce conformity. By 1744, the system was being freely propagated in Rome itself. (shrink)

One method for investigating the neurobiology of consciousness is to experimentally manipulate consciousness as a variable and then visualize the resultant functional brain changes with advanced imaging techniques. To begin investigation into this area, healthy volunteers underwent positron emission tomography scanning while listening to randomized word lists in both conscious and unconscious conditions. Following anaesthesia, subjects had no explicit memories. Nonetheless, subjects demonstrated implicit memory on a forced-choice test . These subsequent memory scores were correlated with regional brain metabolism measured (...) during encoding. Conscious recall and unconscious recognition memory demonstrated considerable anatomic overlap in correlating significantly with relative glucose metabolism in auditory verbal memory areas. However, only conscious recall correlated with mediodorsal thalamic nucleus activity; unconscious recognition memory did not. These findings suggest that conscious versus unconscious memory distinctions may depend on the presence or absence of correlated thalamic activity, and directly implicate the thalamus in the neurobiology of consciousness. (shrink)

Venneman and colleagues argue that “do not resuscitate” (DNR) is problematic and should be replaced by “allow natural death” (AND). Their argument is flawed. First, while end-of-life discussions should be as positive as possible, they cannot and should not sidestep painful but necessary confrontations with morality. Second, while DNR can indeed be nonspecific and confusing, AND merely replaces one problematic term with another. Finally, the study’s results are not generalisable to the populations of physicians and working nurses and certainly do (...) not support the authors’ claim that there is a movement to replace DNR with AND. (shrink)

The freedom, in Latin libertas, is the object of philosophical reflection since Plato. Yet as the determined philosophical direction it took the form of the „liberalism” on the turning point of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, represented by two philosophers: Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). Among contemporary scholars Isaiah Berlin is standing out. From his point of view the philosophical problem of the freedom should be examined in two aspects: the negative freedom i.e. the attribute of not hindered (...) freedom in making choices and the positive freedom as opportunity of being the master of one’s own fate. The author of the article, after critical demonstrating the conception of liberalism, sketches the theory of freedom from the position of Christian ethics. As a starting point he takes the conception of man as a person whose rational activities take on the form of twofold freedom of choice. In the psychological aspect, this freedom assumes the ambivalent form of doing good or evil, however in the moral aspect it turns out to be freedom put in order by the hierarchy of objective moral values. In this meaning the freedom also organizes the whole free man's activity and becomes creative strength of his moral personal perfection. It also defines the crucial sense of Christian philosophical science of truth about freedom. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction VIOLENCE AND INSTITUTION IN CHRISTIANITY Robert J. Daly, SJ. Boston College We need both to define our terms and to indicate whether we are using them in a normative or descriptive sense. Thus the question: "Is Christianity"—or, if you will—"Are the institutions of Christianity violent or nonviolent?" can be answered with either a Yes, or a No, or with anything in between, depending on the meaning we attach (...) to theterms "violence," "institution," and "Christianity" (Daly 1997, 321-43). When we speak normatively, or take Christianity and its institutions accordingto its best ideals, Christianity isessentially nonviolent. But when we speak descriptively, i.e., take Christianity according to what the institutions ofChristianity have actually done, and according to how those who call themselves Christian have actually acted, we can make the argument that Christianity is violent, ffanalogous distinctions can be made from within the other four traditions, this might offer a good starting point for discussion. Adapting to my purpose standard dictionary definitions, I understand violence to include in a broad way the justified or unjustified human exertion of internal or external power or force in order to achieve an injurious or abusive end, i.e., an end that is against the will, the good, or the interests of those who suffer it. (This includes all war and avoids, at least at the outset, arguments about whether a war is or can be a "just war.") I understand institution in its ordinary meaning of: any significant or established practice, relationship, structure, system, or organization in a society or culture. I understand Christianity also in its ordinary sense: the Roberti. Daly, SJ.5 religion which, derived from Jesus Christ, and based on the Bible, is professed by Eastern, Roman Catholic, and Protestant bodies. Now, to help set the background for our discussion, I will try to list and briefly describe, relative to this theme, some of the major aspects or "moments" of Christianity (or Christian History), and do this in an approximately diachronic or chronological order. Much of this will be descriptive, but I will not go out of my way to dissociate the descriptions from the effects of all normative claims. I.Violence and Institution in the History of Christianity [1] The biblical foundation of Christianity in the Hebrew Scriptures. [2]The pervasiveness of violence in the Bible. [3]The Christian Scriptures present themselves as a gospel of peace. [4]Jesus and nonviolence. [5]Early Christians and nonviolence. [6]The early Christians and the military. [7]The "Constantinian turn." [8]Caesaro-papism. [9]The relegation ofChristian pacifism to religious and monastic life. [10]The just war theory. [11]The medieval Christian taken-for-grantedness of violence. [12]The Crusades. [13]Medieval Christian peace movements [14]Christians and heretics. The Inquisition. See [11] above. [1 5]Christianity and the witches. See [U] above. [16]The Reformation. [17]The Radical Reformation and the Peace Churches. [18]St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre (August 1572). [19]The religious wars. [20]Absolutism. [21]Modernity. [22]The Quakers—Religious Society of Friends. [23]The Enlightenment and Modernity. [24]Christianity and world mission; Christianity and colonialism. [25]Slavery. [26]Christianity and the "war" against native cultures. [27]Christianity and the First World War. [28]The Second World War. [29]The Holocaust. 6 Violence and Institution in Christianity [30]Christianity and the modern peace movement. [31]Christians and the "seamless ethic of life." [32]Christianity and International Communism. [33]Liberation theology. [34]The liberation of women. [35]Christianity and the resurgence of tribal and nationalist violence. [36]Christianity and human rights. [1] The biblical foundation of Christianity in the Hebrew Scriptures. Christians and Jews have the same family origins. Since believing Christians no less than believing Jews accept and revere the Hebrew Scriptures as the inspired word of God, Christians and Jews are indeed, to paraphrase Pope John XXIII, siblings. There is, beyond this, fromJudaism to Christianity, a significant parent-child relationship. In recent years (but not early enough to have prevented the Holocaust), the main line churches ofChristianity have rejected the supersessionism (the doctrine that the Old Testament has been abrogated by the New Testament) that used to characterize Christian attitudes towards the Jews and that... (shrink)

In 1917 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin wrote an essay that proposes union as a way to observe how the process of evolution takes place. He spent the remainder of his life broadening and sharpening the vision, which was based on union in nature. We propose that this vision and the historical development of thermodynamics and classical statistical mechanics offer insight into union and even into the divine life that many Christians believe to be triadic. We briefly situate union in the (...) triune divine life in early Christian tradition as it was believed and practiced. We then interpret three stages of development in the sciences of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics that support the theme of union in nature. Next we describe the development of Teilhard's thought during his scientific career and his tests of the theme of union, principally in his private journals, now being edited. We offer examples of Teilhard's application of union to his own spiritual life and compare his understanding of union with those of Paul the Apostle and John of the Cross. Finally, although the Christian God's triadic life was not a particular concern of Teilhard, we propose union in nature as a vestige of the divine life. (shrink)

In this text, we ask if analogy can enable a dialogue between religion and the social sciences. To do so, we focus in the conflict between the biblical understanding of man as a created being and the notion of human nature as a social construct. Although there seems to be a fundamental dispute in social constructivism between nature and freedom (Ian Hacking), we consider analogical reasoning (Mauricio Beuchot) enables anthropological views, like Philip Hefner’s, that include central aspects of the doctrine (...) of creation and understand nature and freedom as complementary human features, thus allowing the desired dialogue. (shrink)

In examining Ennead VI 4[22], we find Plotinus in conflict with modern, i.e., Cartesian or Kantian, assumptions about the relation of soul and body and the identification of the self with the subject. Curiously, his images and exposition are more in tune with Twentieth Century notions such as wave and field. With these as keys, we are in a position to unlock the subtlety of Plotinus' analysis of the way soul and body are present together, with sensation structured through the (...) body and judgment coming from the soul. The problem of the self concerns not only the unity of the self in terms of body and soul, but also how the self is constituted in relation to other selves, both keeping its individuality and sharing its experiences at the same time. (shrink)

"This fine book is ideal for introductory courses in philosophy, and it is executed and backed up by careful, sophisticated philosophical analysis and insight." —_W. Norris Clarke, S.J., Fordham University_ _ _ _Human Knowing_ is a clearly written, brief introduction that guides the reader through an exploration of sense perception, ordinary knowing, scientific knowing, and philosophic knowing. This journey culminates in a justification of philosophy as a genuine form of knowing and thus a natural prelude to metaphysics. Though Felt manages (...) to avoid technical language, the development of his argument is a genuine exercise in philosophic thinking. The outcome is a contemporary expression of a position similar to that of Thomas Aquinas, significantly enriched by insights from Bergson, Whitehead, and phenomenology. (shrink)

Context: Philosophical debates in recent decades have developed new ways of dealing with old philosophical problems such as reality, truth, knowledge, language, communication, and action. These new approaches deserve serious consideration because they can improve the discourse of radical constructivism. Problem: This paper discusses the following problem: How can we overcome dualistic and ontological approaches to basic philosophical problems – problems that are relevant to all scientific domains? Method: The method applied here can be roughly described as a transition from (...) entities/substantives/identities to actions and processes, the actions and processes from which so-called entities result. Action-orientation – or an actor-based process – is necessarily combined with sense-orientation as provided by culture and society. Results: The paper demonstrates how the problems mentioned above can be reformulated in a non-dualistic and non-ontological way. Implications: Opening up constructivist thinking to insights provided by neighbouring philosophical approaches facilitates interdisciplinary cooperation and helps overcome dualistic remnants – as well as the cognitive one-sidedness of traditional constructivism. (shrink)

Problem: Mitterer's critique of the central argumentations of radical constructivists has been mostly neglected until today. The paper presents and evaluates his criticism and, in the second part, outlines a format of constructivism that tries to draw appropriate consequences. Solution: In his critique Mitterer explains why the radical constructivism represented above all by Maturana, Varela, von Glasersfeld or Roth still remains in a dualistic format. In his view Neurobiology is used in their writings as the indisputable basis for deriving far-reaching (...) epistemological consequences. Therefore constructivism evades self-application. To overcome this serious critique a different approach to constructivist thinking is sketched that operates without using any biological or psychological theories, tries to avoid dualism, and elaborates Mitterer's basic argument that the description of an object and the object under description are the same. Benefits: The paper shows what constructivism can learn from a serious critique and how it can be rewritten in a non-dualistic way. (shrink)